They likewise interpreted (eternity) in these two senses, making eternity (1), in one of its two senses, equivalent in meaning to necessity. They said: “The proof establishing intrinsic origination is that everything contingent in itself requires, by virtue of itself (2), nonexistence, whereas through another it requires existence. What (3) is by virtue of itself is prior to what is through another. Nonexistence, in its case (4), is therefore prior to existence by an intrinsic priority, so it is originated through an [origination] (5) intrinsic to itself.”

Al-Rāzī raised the following objection against them:

“It is impermissible to say that the contingent requires nonexistence by virtue of itself. Had it required nonexistence by virtue of itself, it would have been impossible, not contingent. Rather, what may truly be said of the contingent is that it is not existent by virtue of what it is; it cannot truly be said that, by virtue of what it is, it is nonexistent. The distinction between these two perspectives is well known. Just as the contingent requires existence through the existence of its cause, it requires nonexistence through the nonexistence of its cause. Since its requiring both existence and nonexistence derives from another (6), and neither is entailed by its essence, neither has priority over the other. Its nonexistence therefore has no intrinsic priority over its existence.”

He said: (7) “Perhaps what is meant by this argument [is] (8) that the contingent derives from—