the rulings governing the actions of the servants: namely, that a ruling consists solely in the relation of the meaning subsisting in the Essence to the act. As for the meaning subsisting in the Essence and relating to the act, they do not affirm (1) that faith, piety, and righteous deeds possess any distinctive quality by which they differ (2) from evil deeds and for the sake of which He commanded them. The same holds for prophethood.

The Mu'tazila and those who agree with them posit a law governing Allah by analogy with His servants. They deem obligatory upon Him things of the same kind as those obligatory upon them, and deem forbidden to Him things of the same kind as those forbidden (3) to them. They do not regard His command and prohibition, His love and hatred, or His pleasure and wrath as having any effect upon actions. Rather, the characteristics of actions are fixed independently of the divine address, which merely discloses them, like someone reporting the existing characteristics of the sun, moon, and stars.

Allah—Glorified is He—has stated that He selects messengers from among the angels and from among humankind. The term istifā' (selection) is an ifti'āl form derived from tasfiya (purification), just as ikhtiyār (choice) is an ifti'āl form derived from khiyara (choosing the best). Thus, He chooses the one who is to be specially chosen.

He has said:

“Allah knows best where to place His message.”

[Surah al-Anām: 124] (4)

Thus, He knows best whom to make a messenger and whom not to make a messenger. If every person were fit for messengership (5), this would not be possible.

He knows precisely whom to appoint as the messenger and knows that he is more entitled to messengership than anyone else, as the Quran indicates. Khadīja—may Allah be pleased with her—said, when revelation suddenly came upon the Prophet (6)