Indeed, as for the accidental properties and attributes that arise in a living being without its choice—such as health, sickness, old age, and the like—no rational person says that the being itself brought them about, originated them, or produced them. How much less could this be said of an attribute inseparable [from it] (1), such as its life and what necessarily follows from it?

Likewise, no rational person says this of nonliving things, such as inanimate matter (2), plants, or other bodies. No rational person says that any such thing brought about its own inherent magnitude and its own act of choosing (3), or any of its other inseparable attributes (4). Rather, among all rational people—both those who affirm natural and volitional actions and those who affirm only volitional actions—none regards any attribute inseparable from an entity as something produced by that entity, whether voluntarily or by nature. Instead, they distinguish between the effects proceeding from it, which are its actions and products, and its attributes, both those inseparable from it and, indeed, (5) those that are not.

An entity may have a causal role in the acquisition of some of its incidental attributes, in which case their acquisition is attributed to its action because it occurs through that action. Examples include acquiring knowledge through reflection and inference, and becoming satiated and quenched through eating and drinking. This is unlike inseparable attributes and anything that arises without the entity’s power, action, or choice (6). No rational person says that the entity causally affects such a thing or that it is one of the entity’s effects. Rather, one says that it is inseparable from the entity and is one of its attributes, that the entity necessarily entails it and is characterized by it. One may also say that it is constitutive and perfective of the entity, or the like. They concede