not contingent things that may either exist or not exist (1), nor do they require an agent to bring them about or an efficient cause. Rather, they are necessary concomitants of the essence, which, together with the attributes inseparable from it, is necessarily existent. Thus, the claim that its inseparable attributes are contingent in existence and admit of either existence or nonexistence is no different from the claim that the essence to which they necessarily belong admits of either existence or nonexistence.
If, however, by his statement, “The Necessary Existent is one,” he means that (2) the Necessary Existent is an essence divested of attributes, this is inadmissible, and he has cited no proof for it.
The second response:
It may be said: As for the claimant’s assertion that the Necessary Existent is the essence apart from its attributes, and that its attributes are contingent in existence—if by the Necessary Existent he means that whose nonexistence (3) is impossible, without any agent having produced it, then the same is true of both the essence and its attributes: the nonexistence of either is impossible, without any agent having produced it.
If, by the Necessary Existent, he means that which subsists by itself and requires no subject, the reality of this is simply that the attributes must have a subject in which they subsist, unlike the essence. Yet this does not entail that they are contingent in existence or require an agent.
If he means by the Necessary Existent what cannot be nonexistent, and by the contingent in existence what may either exist or not exist, it is known that the attributes cannot be nonexistent, just as the essence cannot be nonexistent. Necessary existence therefore applies to both.
If by the Necessary Existent he means that which has no inseparable concomitant, then nothing in existence would be necessarily existent—especially according to their doctrine that He is necessarily accompanied by His effects. He would therefore not be the Necessary Existent.
Among the contradictions of these men and those who followed them—such as the author of the books known as al-Madnūn (The Withheld):