philosophers](1), nor does any speculative thinker hold this position, whether among the Mu'tazilites, Ash'arites, Karrāmites, or others. Thus, it is not the position of any school of speculative thought—whether theologians, philosophers, or anyone else.

The second response is as follows:

His statement:

(“It is impossible for it to be (nonexistent) without any cause, for it would then be nonexistent because of what it is, and anything whose quiddity is sufficient to account for its nonexistence cannot possibly exist.”)

The reply is that this implication is false. If it is nonexistent without any cause, then it is not nonexistent because of either its own essence or anything else. Hence, your statement:

(“It would then be nonexistent because of what it is”)

is false. It entails that it is nonexistent on account of its own essence and that its essence is the cause of its nonexistence, as is the case with something intrinsically impossible. This contradicts our statement that it is nonexistent without any cause. How, then, could the negation (2) of a thing necessarily follow from its affirmation?

If it is said, “What he means is that it is either due to something or not due to anything external,” the reply is that this division does not exhaust the possibilities, since it may be nonexistent without any cause at all.

The third response is as follows:

There is an evident difference between saying, “Its essence requires neither its existence nor its nonexistence,” or, “It does not entail (3) its existence or its nonexistence,” or, “It necessitates neither its existence nor its nonexistence,” and saying, “Its essence requires either its existence or its nonexistence,” or that it entails or necessitates one of the two. Whatever is such that its essence entails its existence is necessary in itself; whatever is such that its essence entails its nonexistence is impossible; and whatever is such that its essence entails neither is neither necessary nor impossible, but possible.