Moreover, that which is necessarily entailed and that which entails it (1) may be simultaneous. Thus, they say: (2) an attribute depends upon its subject and an accident upon a substance, even though both exist together. They also say: (3) an accident depends upon its subject precisely because it is an entity subsisting in another, and this characteristic coincides with its dependence upon the subject.

[The Sixth Proof and Its Refutation]

[Al-Rāzī] said: (4)

“The sixth proof: When a possible entity does not exist, its nonexistence is either due to something or not due to anything. It is impossible for it not to be due to anything, for it would then be nonexistent by virtue of what it is. Anything whose (essence) suffices for its nonexistence is impossible of existence. Thus, that which may be nonexistent (5) would be impossible of existence, which is a contradiction. It is therefore evident (6) that its nonexistence must be due to something.

“That cause must then either require this nonexistence to arise anew in order to exert its effect upon it, or not require this. It is impossible for this to be required, [for the discussion] (7) concerns the nonexistence preceding its existence, whereas renewed nonexistence is nonexistence after existence. Thus, the dependence of possible entities’ nonexistence upon that which entails their nonexistence does not require that nonexistence to arise anew (8). And if the nonexistence of a possible entity depends upon