[The Fifth Proof and Its Refutation]

Al-Rāzī said (1):

“The fifth proof: Either the basis of possible entities’ dependence upon an efficient cause—or the basis upon which efficient causes (2) act upon them—depends upon temporal origination, or it does not. We invalidated the first alternative in the chapter (3) on ‘Pre-eternity and Temporal Origination.’ It is therefore established that temporal origination has no bearing on the basis of dependence.”

It may be said:

What you stated regarding this has also been shown to be false. Everything dependent upon an agent must necessarily be temporally originated, whereas that which is pre-eternal and beginningless cannot possibly be an effect.

What you mentioned in the “Book of Temporal Origination and Pre-eternity” in al-Mabāhith al-Mashriqiyya is the argument you habitually mention in al-Muhassal and elsewhere: temporal origination consists in existence being preceded by nonexistence and by another. It is therefore an attribute of existence and thus posterior to it. Existence itself is posterior to the efficient cause’s acting upon it; that action is posterior to its need for the cause; and this need is posterior to the cause of the need. If, then, temporal origination were the cause of the need for temporal origination, or a condition of that need, a thing would necessarily be posterior to itself by four levels.

The answer is that this is not a positive attribute inhering in the thing such that it would be posterior to the thing’s existence. Rather, it means that the thing exists after not having existed. It needs an efficient cause precisely in this state, and in this state it is preceded by nonexistence. The instances of posteriority mentioned here are conceptual considerations, not temporal posteriorities. Here, “cause” means that which necessarily entails something else; it does not mean an agent temporally preceding its effect.