And if (1) he says, “This comes after its dependence, whereas what comes later cannot be the cause of what comes earlier,”

it may be said:

“I mentioned this elsewhere, not here. The answer is that it is evidence of dependence, not what necessitates it. Evidence comes after that which it establishes, by agreement of all rational people.”

If it is said:

“If temporal origination is evidence of dependence upon an efficient cause, it does not follow (2) that everything dependent upon an efficient cause is temporally originated, for an indication must hold in the forward direction, but it need not hold conversely.”

It may be said:

“Yes. The failure of the inference from this perspective does not preclude establishing it in other ways. For example, it may be said: ‘Its being temporally originated is a condition of its dependence upon an agent, and a condition accompanies that which it conditions.’ This, too, serves to establish (3) the necessary concomitance. Thus, it may be said: ‘The cause of dependence [in the sense of the condition of its dependence] (4) is its being temporally originated, its being possible, or both together.’ All of these are true.

“Another example is to say: ‘When “cause” means that which necessitates its dependence upon an agent, that cause is its temporal origination—that is, its being preceded by nonexistence. For everything preceded by nonexistence (5) exists at the very time it depends upon an agent. Its dependence upon an agent occurs at the time of its origination, and at that time it is preceded by nonexistence. Indeed, everything preceded by nonexistence comes into existence after not having existed, and this meaning necessarily entails its dependence upon an agent.’”