if (1 it is considered insofar as it is originated, do you mean by this that, if the entire series of originated things is assumed to have a beginning, then 1) (1), when their possibility is considered together with that, this possibility has no beginning; or do you mean that this applies to every particular originated thing you consider whenever its possibility is considered?

If you mean the former, you would be told (2): We do not concede the possibility of this supposition. For you have already maintained that every originated thing must have a beginning, that the aggregate of originated things is preceded by nonexistence, and that the agent had originated nothing and then began to originate. Yet, [along with] (3) that, you supposed that his act of origination had always been possible. We do not concede that these two can be combined. Thus, you (4) denied that he had been an originator perpetually from eternity only because originated things with no beginning are impossible. But if that is impossible, origination cannot have always been possible. You have therefore supposed perpetual origination to be possible (5) while its perpetuity is impossible. This amounts to supposing that two contradictories can coexist.

If, however, by what you suppose you mean the origination of one particular originated thing, we do not concede that its possibility is beginningless. Rather, the origination of every particular originated thing may be conditional upon conditions that preclude its pre-eternity. This is indeed what occurs, as can be seen in many originated things: anything created from matter cannot come into existence before that matter exists. [However, the answer to this argument is that it does not entail the possibility of any particular thing being pre-eternal, as has been explained at length elsewhere. It therefore does not follow that any particular contingent entity could be pre-eternal, which is the point to be established] (6).