He said (1):

(There is an objection to this method. We say: If we consider “the originated thing” insofar as it is preceded by nonexistence, then, subject to this condition, it cannot be said that its possibility is restricted to one time rather than another, in view of the proofs you have mentioned. Hence, (2) its possibility is perpetually established. Yet the perpetuity of its possibility does not entail that it ceases to be originated. For when we considered it insofar as it is preceded by nonexistence, its being preceded by nonexistence became an essential constituent of it, and an essential constituent cannot be removed. If the possibility of an originated thing coming into existence, considered insofar as it is originated, does not entail that it ceases to be originated, then this argument is invalid.)

He said (3):

(This is an objection that must be resolved.)

I say: The response is: (4) This objection is the counterargument upon which he relied in his theological works, such as (al-Arba‘īn) (5), and elsewhere. Al-Āmidī likewise relied upon it in (Daqā’iq al-Haqā’iq) and elsewhere (6). It is invalid for two reasons:

First, it contains no answer to their argument; rather, it is merely a counterargument.

Second, it may be said: His statement, (“the originated thing”)