The second:

It remains possible at all future times. If its possibility is intrinsic to it or due to a permanent cause, its possibility must be perpetual. If it is due to an originated cause, that is untenable, because the argument concerning the possibility of that cause coming into existence is the same as the argument concerning the possibility of anything else coming into existence. The possibility (1) of the act must therefore be perpetual.

The third:

If the impossibility of the act is intrinsic to it or due to a cause that is necessary in itself (2), its impossibility must be perpetual. Yet this is disproved by sensory perception, necessary knowledge, and the consensus of rational people, since contingent things exist. If, however, it is due to a cause that is not necessary, that cause cannot be pre-eternal; for whatever must be pre-eternal cannot be nonexistent. The discussion (3) concerning it is then the same as the discussion concerning the first case. [That it should be impossible in pre-eternity due to an originated cause is manifestly false, for what is pre-eternal cannot be due to an originated cause] (4)).

He said (5):

(It is therefore established that one cannot claim that the existence of contingent things in pre-eternity was impossible. Nor can it be said: The efficient cause (6) could not act upon it and then became able to do so, for the argument concerning the impossibility and possibility of causal action is the same as the argument concerning the impossibility and possibility of the effect’s existence).

He said (7): It is therefore established that the dependence of contingent things upon an efficient cause does not entail their being preceded by nonexistence.