The point here is to explain that the question of how to judge those engaged in dispute—whether they are correct or mistaken, rewarded or punished, believers or unbelievers—is a subsidiary of this comprehensive general principle, which encompasses these issues and others.

This makes clear the third position concerning this principle: not everyone who exercises independent reasoning and considers the evidence is capable of knowing the truth, and no one deserves the threatened punishment unless he neglects something he was commanded to do(1) or commits something forbidden. This is the position(2) of the jurists and leading scholars, the well-known position of the early generations of the Muslim community, and the position of the majority of Muslims.

This position combines what is correct in the other two positions. The correct element in the first position—the position of the Jahmiyya, in which they agreed with the early generations and the majority—is that not everyone who seeks something, exercises independent reasoning, and considers the evidence concerning it is capable of knowing the truth about it. Rather, people’s capacities in this regard vary.

The Qadariyya say(3) that Allah Most High gave all morally accountable people equal capacity and did not distinguish the believers, before they believed, with anything by which He favored them over the unbelievers; nor did He distinguish the obedient, before they obeyed, with anything by which He favored them over the disobedient.

This is among the doctrines(4) of the Qadariyya, the Mutazila, and others by which they opposed the Book, the Sunnah, the consensus of the early generations, and sound reason, as has been explained at length elsewhere. Hence, they said: “Everyone who considers the evidence possesses a complete capacity by which he can attain knowledge of the truth.”