The first and second senses are impossible in pre-eternity—especially the first (1), for no rational person maintains it. The argument does not demonstrate that He exercised causal influence upon everything in pre-eternity, or upon any particular thing in pre-eternity.

As for the third sense, it contradicts their position rather than supporting it. Indeed, it entails the origination of everything other than Him. If (2) His exercise of causal influence is a necessary concomitant of His essence, while events are witnessed—and causal influence is inconceivable except together with bringing something into existence—then the second act of bringing into existence is conditional upon the first preceding it and also coming to an end. Such acts, one after another, would be necessary concomitants of His essence.

Thus, the argument contains nothing that supports their position or contradicts what the messengers have reported, even if it does demonstrate the falsity of the position held by a group among the proponents of speculative theology newly introduced into Islam—namely, the Jahmiyyah, the Qadariyyah, and those who followed them.

The same applies to the arguments by which they seek to establish the impossibility of bringing things into existence and exercising causal influence, and to similar specious arguments that entail (3) denying causal influence, denying that a contingent thing’s existence can be given preponderance over its nonexistence, and denying that He acts for a wise purpose—or without one—as well as the other claims mentioned under this topic. All of them entail that no event could ever occur in the world, which is contrary to what is witnessed. Every argument entailing something contrary to witnessed reality belongs to the class of sophistical [arguments] (4).

They are also all agreed that privation is among the causes, and this is taken from—