from among the speculative theologians, including the Muʿtazilis, the Jahmis, and those who followed their path. This position was then adopted by people who propounded it in legal theory, without understanding its true nature or its full implications.

They say:

Besides being a newly introduced innovation (1) in Islam—unsupported by the Book, the Sunnah, or consensus, and never maintained by any of the early generations or leading authorities—this distinction between fundamental and subsidiary questions is also rationally invalid. Those who distinguish (2) between what they classify as fundamental questions and subsidiary questions have not drawn (3) any sound distinction that differentiates the two categories. Rather, they have mentioned three or four distinctions, all of which are invalid.

Some of them say:

Fundamental questions are theoretical matters of belief, in which only knowledge and belief are required, whereas subsidiary questions are practical matters, in which action is required.

They say:

This distinction (4) is invalid, for practical matters include some whose denial constitutes disbelief, such as the obligation of the five prayers, zakat, and fasting the month of Ramadan, and the prohibition of fornication, usury, injustice, and indecencies. Conversely, theoretical matters include some over which disputants incur no sin. Examples include the Companions’ disagreement over whether Muhammad saw his Lord; their disagreement concerning certain texts—whether the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, actually said them and what he intended them to mean; their disagreement concerning certain words—whether or not they form part of the Quran; and their disagreement over some of the meanings of the Quran