one who errs in them.

Others say this is because (1) error in matters admitting only probable conclusions is impossible, as was previously related from some of the Jahmis and Asharis. As for decisive matters, most of them deem anyone who errs in them sinful, maintaining that revelation establishes this. Some of them, however, do not deem him sinful. This is the meaning of the position attributed to ʿUbayd Allāh ibn al-Hasan al-ʿAnbarī (2): he did not deem an erring qualified jurist from this nation sinful, whether in fundamental or subsidiary matters. The majority of both groups—the theologians and the jurists of opinion—rejected this position of ʿUbayd Allāh.

Others, however, say that this is the position of the early generations and the leading authorities who issued legal verdicts, such as Abū Hanīfa, al-Shāfiʿī, al-Thawrī, Dāwūd ibn ʿAlī, and others. They did not deem an erring qualified jurist sinful in either fundamental or subsidiary matters, as Ibn Hazm and others reported of them. For this reason, Abū Hanīfa, al-Shāfiʿī, and others accepted the testimony of adherents of deviant doctrines—with the exception of the Khattābiyya (3)—and regarded prayer behind them as valid. By contrast, a disbeliever’s testimony concerning Muslims is not accepted, nor is prayer performed behind him.

They say that this is the well-known position of the Companions, those who followed them faithfully, and the leading authorities of the religion: they neither declare any erring qualified jurist a disbeliever or a sinner nor deem him sinful, whether the issue is practical or doctrinal.

They say that the distinction between fundamental and subsidiary questions is merely one of the doctrines of the people of innovation