[Arguments of Ibn Sīnā and Others That Action Does Not Require Prior Nonexistence]

[The First Proof and the Response to It]

Then these anomalous later thinkers, who claimed that action does not require prior nonexistence, advanced arguments in support of their position (1). These arguments were mentioned by Ibn Sīnā and other later thinkers of their school, and al-Rāzī examined them exhaustively in his al-Mabāhith al-Mashriqiyya (Eastern Investigations). He presented what he called ten (2) proofs, all of which are false (3).

He said (4):

The first (5): That which requires (6) prior nonexistence must be either the existence of the action itself or [it must be] (7) the influence exerted upon it by the agent. It is impossible for that which requires prior nonexistence to be the existence of the action itself (8), because if the action depended for its existence upon nonexistence, that nonexistence would have to coincide with it; yet concomitant nonexistence is incompatible with that existence. It is likewise impossible for the influence exerted by the agent (9) to depend upon it, because the agent’s influence must coincide with the effect, while the effect’s existence is incompatible with its nonexistence. Whatever is incompatible with something that must coincide with another thing must itself be incompatible with that other thing, and something incompatible cannot be a condition. Therefore, neither the action