temporal events arise within such a part, even while their perpetual succession is held to be possible. Indeed, its being beginningless is impossible, as explained above. All these premises are evident to anyone who reflects upon and understands them.

It is thus clear that, if anything in the universe were beginningless and eternal, its agent would have to be one whose effects proceed necessarily from His essence. Yet if the Agent of the universe were one whose effects proceed necessarily from His essence, no temporal event could arise within the universe; but temporal events within it are directly witnessed (1). It is therefore impossible for the Agent of (2 the universe to be one whose effects proceed necessarily from His essence, and consequently impossible for 2) (2) the universe to be eternal, as those Eternalists (3) maintained. Indeed, it is also impossible for any particular entity produced by the Agent to be beginningless, especially given that He acts by His own choice. Thus, under this supposition—namely, that temporal events and their perpetual succession are possible, while it is impossible for temporal events to proceed without a temporally originated cause—nothing in the universe can be beginningless.

If it is said that the Agent of the universe (4) possesses power and acts by choice—as Muslims, the adherents of all other religions, and the leading philosophers before Aristotle (5) maintain—then the originating Agent must will His effects at the time He produces them. Allah Most High says:

{Our word to a thing, when We will it, is only that We say to it, “Be!” and it is.}

[Surah al-Nahl: 40]

The existence of an eternal will encompassing all successive events does not suffice without a renewed will directed toward that particular temporal event, because, on this supposition, it would follow that temporal events could arise without a temporally originated cause.