This, along with similar evidence, [is among what] (1) explains the doubt that led those who fought him to do so and the basis on which they exercised their judgment to fight him (2). Yet it does not show that they were correct to withhold their allegiance from him and fight him. Nor does the fact that ʿUthmān’s killers were among his subjects necessarily mean that he agreed with them (3).

Some people have sought to excuse ʿAlī on the grounds that he (4) did not know the killers individually; that he (5) did not hold that a group could be put to death for killing one person; or that the person entitled to seek retribution had not brought before him a claim warranting judgment in his favor.

There is no need for such excuses (6). Rather, with the people divided over him, ʿAlī could not have executed ʿUthmān’s killers without unleashing turmoil that would only have made matters worse and increased the affliction. Averting the worse of two evils by accepting the lesser is preferable to the reverse. They formed an army and had tribes that would become incensed on their behalf. Although those among them who had directly committed the killing—N, M: “the killing”—were few, their supporters (7) were men of military strength; otherwise, they could not have carried it out. When Talha and al-Zubayr went to Basra to kill ʿUthmān’s killers, this led to a war in which (8) many people were killed.

Among the things demonstrating this is that the people unanimously accepted (9) Muʿāwiya after ʿAlī’s death,