ʿAmmār ibn Yāsir, or someone else—declared another Companion—ʿUthmān or another—to be an unbeliever, * or deemed it lawful to kill him on the basis of an interpretive judgment—then this would fall under the aforementioned category of interpretation. It would not impugn the faith of either of them or their being among the people of Paradise. Indeed, ʿUthmān and others * (1) are superior to Hātib ibn Abī Baltaʿa, while ʿUmar is superior to ʿAmmār, ʿĀʾisha, and others; and Hātib’s sin was graver (2). Thus, if Hātib was forgiven his sin, ʿUthmān is even more deserving of forgiveness. If someone such as ʿUmar or Usayd ibn Hudayr could exercise independent judgment by declaring someone an unbeliever or deeming it lawful to kill him, without that judgment corresponding to the truth, then it is all the more conceivable that something similar should have proceeded from ʿĀʾisha (3) and ʿAmmār.

Fourth, it may be said: [Indeed,] (4) this reported criticism of ʿUthmān by ʿĀʾisha, if authentic, must have been either correct or mistaken. If it was correct, it cannot be counted among ʿĀʾisha’s faults; and if it was mistaken, it cannot be counted among ʿUthmān’s faults. To impute deficiency (5) to both ʿĀʾisha and ʿUthmān on this basis is categorically (6) false.

Furthermore, ʿĀʾisha displayed such anguish over the killing (7) of ʿUthmān, such condemnation of his killers, and such desire to exact retribution from them that this indicates remorse for whatever was contrary to that—just as her regret over marching to the Battle of the Camel became evident. If her remorse for that indicates ʿAlī’s virtue and her recognition that he was in the right, then this likewise indicates ʿUthmān’s virtue and her recognition that he was in the right. If not, then neither does this.