so he made composition an indication of contingency. The theologians, meanwhile, claimed that their proof was the very proof given by Abraham, the intimate friend, in his words:

“I do not love those that set.”

[Surah al-An‘ām: 76]

They interpreted setting as motion. Ibn Sīnā said:(1)

“Some people have said that this perceptible thing exists through itself and is necessary in itself. Yet if you recall what has been said(2) regarding the condition of the Necessary Existent, you will not find this perceptible thing to be necessary, and you will recite(3) the words of the Most High:

‘I do not love those that set.’

For falling within the domain of contingency is a kind of setting.”

By “condition,” he means that it is not composite, that whatever is composite is contingent rather than necessary, and that the contingent is something that sets because contingency is a kind of setting(4). That which sets(5), according to them, is whatever exists through another.

They say: “We infer the Necessary Existent from the contingency of contingent things. We also maintain that the world is beginningless: it has always existed and will always exist. We therefore take the words of the Most High:

‘I do not love those that set’

to mean, namely,(6) ‘I do not love contingent things,’ even if a contingent thing is necessarily existent through another, eternal and beginningless(7), having always existed and continuing forever.”

It is well known that both positions are instances of distorting words from their proper meanings. Setting simply means disappearance(8) and concealment; it is neither contingency nor motion.