by necessity—namely, the fact(1) that a contingent thing is something whose existence instead of its nonexistence, and whose nonexistence instead of its existence, are both possible. This applies only to what can be [existent and can also be](2) nonexistent. Whatever is necessarily beginningless, whether through itself or through another, cannot be nonexistent and therefore cannot be contingent.

They said:

“This is something upon which the great majority of rational people have agreed. Even Aristotle and his ancient followers maintain that a contingent thing can only be temporally originated. The same is true of Ibn Rushd the Grandson and other later proponents of their school.

“Only a group [among them](3), such as Ibn Sīnā and others like him, maintained that a contingent thing can be beginningless. Al-Rāzī and others followed him in this. Consequently, objections were raised against these people to which [they](4) have no sound answer, as al-Rāzī himself presented some of them in his al-Muhassal.

“Their most rigorous thinkers do not maintain that mere temporal origination is what makes a thing dependent upon an agent, such that they would say that an originated thing, once it continues to exist, is independent of its agent. Rather, they maintain that it needs the agent both when it originates and while it continues to exist, and that a contingent thing can neither originate nor continue to exist except through an efficient cause.

“Thus, the great majority of Muslims—and indeed the great majority(5) of rational people—who uphold this position do not say that anything in the world is independent of Allah while it continues to exist. Rather, they maintain that if it were supposed not to have originated in time, it could not be an effect dependent upon an efficient cause. Thus, beginninglessness