the convergence of the proofs gives his knowledge greater strength. Each proof can take the place of the other when the other is absent (1) from his mind.

[Another Proof of the Falsity of the Claim That the World Is Beginningless]

Yet although no rational person is known to have said this, and although its contrary is [something] (2) known through revelation, we shall also present the rational demonstration of its falsity. We say:

Just as whatever is established to be beginningless cannot be nonexistent, whatever may be nonexistent cannot be beginningless. For if it were beginningless, its nonexistence would be impossible; but the supposition is that it may be nonexistent, so it cannot be beginningless. Moreover, if something can originate in time, its nonexistence is not impossible; rather, it may be nonexistent. It has already been established that whatever may be nonexistent cannot be beginningless, for if it were beginningless, its nonexistence would not be possible but impossible.

This premise is agreed upon among speculative thinkers—theologians, philosophers, and others. Its soundness may be demonstrated as follows: Whatever is established to be beginningless must be beginningless either in itself or through another. What is beginningless in itself is necessary in itself, while what is beginningless through another is necessary through another.

Therefore, anyone who maintains that the world, or any part of it, is beginningless must say that it is necessary either in itself or through another. He cannot then say that it is necessary neither in itself nor through another. For if something beginningless in itself were not necessary in itself, it would be contingent and dependent upon another. If it came into being in time, it would not be beginningless; and if it were beginningless through another, it would not be beginningless in itself. Yet it was assumed to be beginningless in itself. It is thus established that whatever is beginningless in itself is necessary in itself.

As for what is beginningless through another, most rational thinkers maintain that nothing can be beginningless by virtue of an agent. Whoever permits this maintains that such a thing is beginningless by virtue of the beginninglessness of that which necessitates it and is necessary in itself,