and if the world’s coming into being is possible, its being beginningless is impossible, for it can [not] (1) be beginningless except through the beginninglessness of the cause that necessitates it.

If it is assumed that there is such a necessitating cause [for it] (2), then its beginninglessness is necessary and its coming into being is impossible. If its coming into being is possible, its being beginningless is impossible; likewise, if its being beginningless is possible, its coming into being is impossible. For it can be beginningless only through the beginninglessness of that which necessitates it, in which case its coming into being is impossible.

Thus, when something that is mentally possible—admitting both existence and nonexistence—has a complete necessitating factor, its existence becomes necessary; otherwise, its nonexistence becomes necessary. Whatever Allah wills comes to pass, and whatever He does not will does not come to pass. In external reality, there is only that whose existence is necessary in itself or through another, or that whose existence is impossible in itself or through another. The same (3) applies to the beginninglessness or coming into being of a possible thing: in external reality, its beginninglessness is either necessary or impossible. If that which necessitates its beginninglessness is present, whether in itself or through another, it is beginningless; otherwise, its beginninglessness is impossible, and it must either remain perpetually nonexistent or come into being. Thus, once it is held that its coming into being is possible, the cause necessitating it cannot be beginningless, and consequently it cannot itself be beginningless.

It therefore cannot be said:

“Its coming into being is possible, while it may also be beginningless.”

Rather, (4) once the possibility of its coming into being is established, the impossibility of its being beginningless is established.

For this reason, everyone who allows temporal events (5) to occur without a newly arising cause holds that the world came into being. As for those who hold that it is beginningless, none of them maintains that temporal events may occur without a newly arising cause—even though one might conceive of formulating such a position by—