Second:

For Him to originate temporal events one after another without a cause subsisting in Him that necessitates their origination is impossible. For if His Essence were in exactly the same state before this event, after it, and when it occurs (1), it would be impossible for Him to single out this event, rather than another, for origination. Indeed, it would be impossible for Him to originate anything at all.

Third:

[That] (2), if (3) it is deemed possible for Him to originate something without a cause subsisting in Him, then it must also be possible for the entirety of temporal events to have a beginning, in which case nothing in the world would be beginningless. But if this is not deemed possible (4), their claim that He originates temporal events without a cause subsisting in Him is invalid.

Fourth:

If temporal events cannot be originated without a cause subsisting in Him, their position is invalid. Moreover, if (5) their origination requires a cause subsisting in Him, then such causes must continually subsist in Him, one after another. He would therefore never act except when such a cause subsists in Him. It would consequently be impossible for Him to have any particular effect from all eternity and forever, because it is impossible for such an effect to proceed from an essence that brings about within itself one thing after another. For whatever it produces through this intermediary can only be produced successively. It is therefore impossible for Him to have a particular act that is inseparable from Him; and if that is impossible, it is likewise impossible for Him to have a particular effect that is inseparable from Him.

Fifth:

If one of His effects were assumed to be inseparable from Him from all eternity and forever, this could only be because His Essence was a complete cause necessarily producing it. It is well known that a particular effect—