have an agent that necessarily produces it by virtue of His very essence, whether He is called a complete cause, a complete determining factor, or One who has power and acts by choice.

Yet the existence of an agent that necessarily produces by virtue of His essence [from all eternity] (1) is impossible, because this entails that His effect and necessary consequence be beginningless. This is impossible for several reasons:

Among them is that a particular effect [of the agent] (2) cannot coexist with Him in time while being beginningless together with Him, especially if He is also regarded as acting through His will and power. For it is impossible that the particular object of His power coexist with Him in such a way as to be beginningless along with Him. Indeed, this [is impossible] (3), and is precluded even in the case of something hypothesized to subsist in Him, for its being (4) a beginningless object of will is impossible; it is therefore all the more impossible in the case of something separate from Him.

Another reason is that, if He is posited as a complete cause that necessarily produces by virtue of His essence, His effect must invariably coexist with Him. Everything in the world would therefore be beginningless. This is impossible, contrary to observation and the consensus of all rational people.

[The Claim That Part of the World Is Beginningless and Part Is Not Entails the Invalidity of Their Position in Several Respects]

If it is said:

“Part of the world is beginningless, such as the celestial spheres and the genus of motions, while part is not beginningless, such as particular beings and particular motions,”

then the reply is:

“This entails the invalidity of their position in several respects:

“First: If He can produce temporal events successively, then it is possible for everything other than Him to be temporally originated. The assertion that some particular thing in the world is eternal is therefore an assertion without proof.”