whether they say (1) that they proceed from the One who has power (2) and acts by choice, without affirming that He has an eternal will, as maintained by the Mu'tazilites and Jahmites; or whether they say that they proceed from the One who has power and acts by choice, who wills by an eternal, beginningless will, as maintained by the Kullābites, Ash'arites, and Karrāmites.

On this view, it is impossible for anything in the world to be eternal, (3 for there is nothing in the world 3) (3) except that it is accompanied by temporal events and did not precede them—whether all (4) of that is deemed corporeal, or it is said that there are intellects and souls that are not bodies. There can be no doubt that they are concomitant with temporal events, (* for they are productive agents (5) that necessarily entail them. Thus, if beginningless temporal events cannot exist, temporal events cannot have *) (6) a cause that necessarily entails them, whether that cause is contingent or necessary. On this supposition, the eternal will does not necessitate that what is willed coexist with it; rather, what is willed must exist at a time subsequent to the will.

If it is said:

“Temporal events can continue perpetually and have no beginning,”

then the reply is:

“On this supposition, it is impossible for anything in the world to be eternal and beginningless—not the celestial spheres, the intellects, the souls, elemental matter (7), indivisible atoms (8), or anything else—for everything in the world that is eternal and beginningless must necessarily…”