others, just as it applies to singling out their existence, since (1) everything whose existence is posited has a quiddity concomitant with it.

If it is said:

“The quiddities are an actual reality in external existence, independent of any agent,”

this explicitly entails that they are necessary in themselves and share with the Lord in originating (2) existence. This is false. This objection applies to the view that the nonexistent is not a thing—which is the correct view—[and] to the view (3) of those who say that it is also a thing in external existence.

[Establishing the Soundness of This Proof in Various Ways]

(Chapter)

(4)

This proof may then be formulated (5) by way of division in accordance with every position maintained by any group among the Muslims.

For example, it may be said (6):

[Indeed,] (7) temporal events either cannot continue perpetually and must have a beginning, or their perpetual continuation is not impossible; rather, temporal events without a beginning are possible.

If the former is the case, it follows that temporal events proceed from the Eternal, who is necessarily existent in Himself, without anything whatsoever coming into being, as many of the theologians maintain,