But this presupposes that one of the possible things exists. How, then, can it be conceived that one of two equally possible things, neither of which existed, was itself what necessitated within the simple essence that it bring one rather than the other into existence and make one rather than the other eternal, even though it is one and simple and bears precisely the same relation to all possible things?

If it is said:

“The quiddity of the possible thing, rather than its existence, necessitated this,”

it will be said:

The answer is twofold.

First:

A quiddity abstracted from existence can be conceived only in knowledge—what is termed mental existence—not in external existence; and knowledge follows the thing known. Thus, if the acting essence contained no cause

(* requiring one quiddity rather than another to be singled out for existence, but was instead simple and bore no particular relation to any quiddity, it would be inconceivable *)

(1)

for one of the two quiddities to be singled out for existence rather than the other. It is well known that when an agent conceives what he wishes to do before doing it, what is intended(2) to be done must contain a cause necessitating that it be singled out by the will. A servant’s will has causes external to him(3) that necessitate this specification. As for the Lord, Exalted is He, nothing is external to Him except what originates with Him and is His effect. Thus, if His essence contained nothing necessitating the specification, such specification by Him would be impossible, and consequently action would be impossible.

Second:

It may be said: Grant that the quiddity of a possible thing is established in external reality. Nevertheless, the same argument applies concerning(4) the singling out for existence of those quiddities concomitant with their existence rather than