Now, as for the essence from which preparation, supply, emanation, and reception all proceed, and which brings about the recipient and what is received, the condition and what is conditioned, it is inconceivable to say:

“The only reason its action, emanation, or necessitation differed [and was delayed](1) was that the recipients and conditions differed, or that they were delayed.”

For it will be said:

What is said(2) regarding the differences among the recipients and conditions and their delay applies equally to the differences in [what is received](3) and what is conditioned, and to their delay. There is no existent cause requiring this other than the essence itself, which they deem simple and which is [according to them](4) a complete, eternal cause. Is this not one of the most corrupt assertions according to plain reason?

If they say:

“The reason for this is that there was only this, and that possible things admit only of this,”

it will be said:

Prior to their existence, possible things have no existent reality that could be made the cause for singling out one thing for existence rather than another. After they exist, however, a possible thing may reasonably be regarded as a condition for something else or an impediment to something else. An example is the existence(5) of one of two opposites, which precludes the other [but nothing else](6). Another is the existence of a necessary concomitant, for it is a condition for the existence of that which entails it—that is, the concomitant must exist whenever the latter exists, whether they come into existence together or one precedes the other.