It is replied:

First, for something to be willed necessarily entails its origination. Indeed, even conceiving it as something acted upon necessarily entails its origination, for a particular effect to coexist with its agent is impossible at the very outset (1) of rational reflection.

It is further replied:

Second, if (2) He may have successive acts of will whose kind is perpetual, then there is nothing to preclude everything other than Him from having originated through those acts of will. To maintain, in that case, that any part of the world is beginningless is an assertion wholly without proof.

It is further replied:

Third, the Agent whose nature is to do one thing after another through successive acts of will cannot have any particular act of will (3) (4) or action that is beginningless. Consequently, none of His effects can be beginningless, and therefore no part of the world can be beginningless.

It is further replied:

Fourth, if it is supposed that in pre-eternity He willed that particular entity—such as the celestial sphere—with a will coexistent with the object willed, [He would necessarily have willed its necessary concomitants with a will coexistent with the object willed] (5), for the existence of that which entails something without its necessary concomitant is impossible. Among its necessary concomitants is the genus of events, and to will that genus with a will coexistent (6 with it in pre-eternity is impossible, because the entire genus cannot exist in pre-eternity.

[The Position of the Kullābiyya]

If it is said:

What it necessarily entails is the perpetual succession of 6) (6) events (7), and it would therefore entail a perpetual will for those events.