and fairness knows that the likes of Mālik, al-Layth ibn Sa‘d, al-Awzā‘i, Abū Hanīfa, al-Thawrī, and Ibn Abī Laylā, as well as al-Shāfi‘i, Ahmad, Ishāq, Abū ‘Ubayd, and Abū Thawr, possessed greater knowledge and understanding of jurisprudence than the two al-‘Askarīs and others like them (1).
Moreover, these men are better than the Awaited One, who does not know what he is saying. If any one of these men possessed a text transmitted from the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—there can be no doubt that a text authentically established from the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—takes precedence over (2) analogical reasoning. If he possessed no such text and did not accept (3) analogical reasoning, he would be ignorant. Analogical reasoning (4), which yields a probable judgment, is better than ignorance accompanied by neither knowledge nor probable belief.
If these people claim, “Everything they say is authentically established (5) from the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace,” this would be (6) even weaker than the assertion of someone who says, “Everything (7) a qualified independent jurist says is a statement (8) of the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace.” A group among the proponents of reasoned opinion indeed holds this view, and their position is closer to the truth than that of the Rāfida (9), for the latter’s claim is manifestly false.
Moreover, this is like the claim of those who say (10): “The practice of the people of Medina (11) was received from