as nonexistent does not require a determining factor. Whoever maintains that it does require a determining factor says: “The absence of its determining factor entails its nonexistence.” Yet it may be answered: “This does entail its nonexistence, but that does not mean it is what necessitates its nonexistence. Nor is its nonexistence necessary in reality; rather, its actual nonexistence has no cause. For the nonexistence of an effect entails the nonexistence of its cause, but it is not the cause of the latter’s nonexistence. Entailment is broader than causation.”] (1); for if that complete determining factor did not entail the existence of the contingent thing, then even in the presence of the complete determining factor, the contingent thing’s existence would remain merely possible—neither necessary nor impossible. It would therefore still be contingent and would depend upon another determining factor, since a contingent thing can come into existence only through a determining factor.

This demonstrates that if there is no determining factor entailing the existence of a contingent thing, its existence is impossible. So long as its existence remains merely possible rather than necessary, it does not come into existence. This is the position of the leading Sunni authorities who affirm divine decree, and the leading philosophers concur with them (2). This is one of the arguments they used to establish that Allah is the Creator of His servants’ actions.

[Complete Power and Resolute Will Entail the Act’s Occurrence]

The Qadariyya among the Muʿtazila and others disagree on this point. They claim that an agent possessed of power can make acting prevail over refraining without anything that necessarily entails that outcome. They assert that if an agent possessed of power were not such, it would follow that he necessitates by his very essence rather than being an agent possessed of power. They say: “A freely choosing agent possessed of power is one who acts if he wills and refrains if he wills. If it is said that he acts only when it is necessary that he act, then he is not freely choosing but compelled.”

The majority among the adherents of the religion and others (3) replied to them: “Rather, this is an error, for—”