and that its possibility is eternal and beginningless, whereas its being preceded by nonexistence entails that it has a beginning and is not eternal and beginningless (1). Their position thus entails both that temporal events must have a beginning and that they need not have a beginning.

This is because they posited an impossible supposition, and an impossible supposition may entail an impossible conclusion, as Allah Most High says:

{Had there been within the heavens and earth gods besides Allah, they both would have been ruined.}

[Surah al-Anbiyā: 22]

For their assertion that “the possibility of the general kind of temporal events—on condition that they are preceded by nonexistence—has no beginning” amounts to saying that what has a beginning has no beginning. Anything conditioned upon being preceded by nonexistence has a beginning (2), and if (3) it is posited as having no beginning, this combines two contradictories.

It may also be said: This is a supposition with no reality outside the mind. It is therefore equivalent to someone saying: “The general kind of temporal events, on condition (4) that they are followed by nonexistence—does their possibility have an end, or does their possibility have no end?” Just as this entails combining two contradictories with respect to the end, so too does the corresponding supposition entail combining two contradictories with respect to the beginning (5).

Furthermore, one of the two alternatives of a possible thing cannot prevail over the other except through a complete determining factor by which the possible thing becomes necessary. They may instead say: “Its existence cannot prevail over its nonexistence except through a complete determining factor that necessarily entails the existence of that possible thing.” [This second formulation is more accurate, as held by Muslim thinkers committed to affirmation, for its continuance