in the knower, power in the powerful, and motion in the moving; and that speech which Allah creates in another is not His speech, but the speech of the locus in which He created it. For when an attribute inheres in a locus, its ruling applies to that locus and does not apply (1) to anything else; a name (2) is derived from it for that locus, but not for anything else.

Thus, if (3) speech created in another were His speech, four false conclusions would necessarily follow:

[The attribute’s ruling and the name derived from it would be affirmed of something other than Allah, while that ruling and name would be denied of Allah. These are two rationally necessary consequences and two scripturally necessary consequences, all of which follow] (4) from the fact that (5) speech (6) is an attribute of that locus rather than of Allah. The locus itself would therefore be the one calling out by virtue of what inheres in it (7). Thus, the tree in which He created (8) the call to Moses would itself be the one saying, “Indeed, (9) I am Allah,” rather than Allah being the One calling out those words. The tree would necessarily be called a speaker and one that called out to Moses, while Allah would necessarily be neither a speaker, nor one who calls out, nor one who converses privately (10).