If (1) you say, “Denying that is a judgment of the faculty of imagination,” you are told, “Then denying this, in that case, (2) has an even greater claim to be deemed a judgment of the faculty of imagination.”

If you say, “Rather, (3) this denial is a judgment of reason,” you are told, “Then that denial is, with even greater reason, a judgment of reason.”

For you say, “A false judgment of the faculty of imagination consists in judging what is not perceptible by the standard applicable to what is perceptible.” Accordingly, if you say, “The Creator—exalted is He—is not perceptible,” you may accept concerning Him what is deemed impossible for perceptible things (4)—namely, the impossibility of being seen without (5) being face-to-face.

But if you say, “He is perceptible”—that is, He can be perceived by the senses—then the judgment of the faculty of imagination would not be invalidated (6) concerning Him. It would therefore be impossible for Him to be neither within the world nor outside it, and in that case it would be possible (7) to see Him.

If you say, “If He is not perceptible, then He cannot be seen,” it is replied, “If by ‘perceptible’ you mean perceptible through ordinary sensory perception, then the vision affirmed by