the other, is impossible; for this one is unable to act until the other assists him, while the other is unable to act until this one assists him. The assistance rendered by each would thus both precede (1) and be preceded [and the power of each would likewise both precede and be preceded]. (2) For this one can render no assistance except by means of his power, (3) yet he has no power except through the assistance of the other; nor can the other render any assistance except by means of his power, yet he has no power except through the assistance of this one. (* Thus, this one’s assistance would depend on his power, which depends on the other’s assistance, which depends on this one’s power *) (4). A thing would therefore precede that which precedes that which precedes itself, and would be the cause of the cause of the cause of itself.
It is thus evident that two lords cannot coexist, whether in agreement or disagreement, and that if another god (5) were posited alongside Allah, it would necessarily follow that each god would take away what he had created and that some would rise above others.
Neither of the two proofs is based upon the other. Rather, each is independent, and each necessarily follows from positing another god; it is not merely one of them that follows. Since independent or cooperative participation in one and the same act and object is impossible, it necessarily follows that each god would take away what he had created. And since two (6) coequal lords cannot coexist, it necessarily follows that some would rise above others. Both conclusions are untenable: created things are interconnected with one another (7), and the subjugated one’s power does not derive from himself but from another, so he is under another’s lordship, not a lord.