one of the inseparable concomitants of his essence; for if this one wills and acts only in conjunction with the other’s will and action, the will and action of each would form part of what necessitates the other’s willing and acting.

This is circularity involving part of the cause. Circularity involving part of the necessitating factor is impossible, just as circularity involving the necessitating factor itself is. If (1) two correlatives, such as fatherhood and sonship, may be inseparably concomitant, that is because the complete factor necessitating both is other than either of them (2). If the two wills and the two acts were inseparably concomitant (3), the complete factor necessitating them would be other than either of the two.

That is impossible, since nothing exists above them to make them so. It follows that neither (4) could will or act.

All of these are rationally intelligible, established, and demonstrated propositions. Whenever a person conceives them correctly, he knows them to be true. They have been set forth in detail elsewhere.

It has thus become clear (5) that, if two gods equal (6) in power were posited, they could do nothing, whether in agreement or disagreement. Therefore, on the supposition of two gods, one of them would necessarily have to be more powerful than the other. The more powerful is necessarily above whoever is lesser in power. Thus, if there were gods, some would necessarily be above others, (7 and if some of them were above others 7) (7), there would not