the two workmen under a single master, the two muftis who refer to the source texts, and the two people consulting one another who refer (1) to a consideration requiring their concurrence. Thus, between any two parties acting jointly there must be a third that brings them together.

As for the two creators, nothing exists above them.

If it were said, “The two of them (2) act according to what is (3) beneficial, or according to something else,” all (4) these originated things would depend upon both of them and proceed from them (5), and nothing would come to be except through their knowledge (6) and power. This differs from a created being who brings things about independently of another and thereby assists the latter in attaining what benefits him.

Suppose it were said, “They knew (7) what would come to be.” Knowledge of a temporally occurring thing depends upon the temporally occurring object known; that thing is (8 dependent upon the will of the one who brings it into being 8) (8), while that will depends upon both of them (9).

As for the two creators, the will of each must either be an inseparable concomitant of his essence, or his essence must independently determine his will. In that case (10), his will could not depend upon the other’s willing as a condition. For if it depended upon that, he would not be independent in willing (11), nor would it be