until that one thwarted him, (1) and that one would not be thwarted until this one thwarted him. It would therefore follow that each was both thwarting and thwarted, which is impossible.

Moreover, each one’s power could cease during their mutual opposition only through the power of the other. Thus, if this one’s power cannot cease until the power of that one causes it to cease, and that one’s power cannot cease until the power of this one causes it to cease, (2) then neither power would cease, and both would remain capable.

Yet it is impossible for both to be capable of acting and able to do so (3) while each is prevented from acting by the other and rendered incapable of it through the other’s prevention (4), for all of this combines contradictories.

If, however, it is assumed that both their agreement and their disagreement are possible, then actualizing (5) agreement rather than disagreement, or disagreement rather than agreement, would require (6) someone to give preponderance to one over the other. Yet there is no determinant (7) apart from the two of them. For one of them to determine the outcome without the other is impossible, while for one to determine it together with the other is itself agreement. Actualizing that agreement would therefore require another determinant, resulting (8) in an infinite regress of causes, which is impossible by the consensus of all rational people.

Furthermore, their agreement is impossible in itself, and their disagreement is likewise impossible in itself, whether it is assumed to be necessary or not. For if they agreed, neither of them, while they were in agreement, could act unless