for Him to be an agent of temporal events. For if He existed without (1) bringing this temporal event into existence, and He is now as He was, then He does not now bring this temporal event into existence.

Ibn Sīnā and others like him who uphold the eternity of the world used this very argument against [the speculative theologians among] (2) the Mu'tazila and the Jahmiyya [and those who agreed with them] (3). They said:

“If He existed in eternity without acting, and He is now in the same state, then He does not act now. Yet He has been posited as an agent. This is a contradiction, which arises only from assuming an essence bereft of action.”

It may be said to them:

“This very argument (4) applies against you for affirming a simple essence in which neither action nor attribute subsists, while temporal events nevertheless proceed from it. If (5) they proceed through intermediaries inseparable from it, then any intermediary inseparable from it is as eternal as it is. Yet you have said that it is impossible for temporal events to proceed from an eternal being that remains in the same state as before.”

The third argument:

It may be said: They maintain that the Necessary Existent (6) continually emanates and that its emanation is unceasing. Certain times are singled out for origination only because preparedness and receptivity arise anew, and the arising of preparedness and receptivity is the cause of the arising of motions.

This argument is false, for this can be conceived only if the agent (7) whose emanation is unceasing is not itself what brings about the preparedness for receptivity, as they claim concerning the Intellect—