occur (1); for there is nothing in the world that is not connected to other parts of the world, as was noted above.

Accordingly, when two cooperating agents do something, the act of each—the act subsisting in him—is distinct from the act of the other. As for what that act produces in the external world, neither can independently bring about anything separate from himself. Rather, according to those who hold that a servant’s act is divided into direct and indirect acts, he must have someone to assist him in bringing it about.

Those who hold, however, that his act does not extend beyond the locus of his power maintain that there is nothing he brings about that is separate from himself (2).

Then, if what one brings about becomes intermingled with what the other brings about—as in the case of two people carrying a beam (3)—each depends upon the other while they act together. Yet each has a power peculiar to himself (4), both when alone and when together, by which he can perform (5) an act independently of the other and thereby be distinguished from him. Each must therefore have an act peculiar to himself, distinct (6) from the act of the other.

It is therefore not (7) conceivable that there should be two gods unless what one brings about is distinct from what the other brings about (8), so that each god would take away what he had created. Since this necessary consequence does not obtain, what would entail it does not obtain either.