coming together except from someone other than the two of them. But two creators cannot have a third party who grants them power; therefore, they must each possess power when separate.
(* If it is said, “One of them is capable of whatever the other agrees with him upon,” (1) then he would be capable only through the other’s agreement. And if it is said, “He is capable of *) (2) whatever the other does not oppose him in,” (3) each of them would be preventing the other from exercising his power, and so neither of them would be capable.
Moreover, this one could prevent the other only by virtue of his power, and the other could prevent this one only by virtue of his power. It therefore follows (4) that each of them would be capable during their mutual obstruction—that is, when they were in disagreement. Thus, they would both be capable whether in agreement or disagreement.
Moreover, this one would not be prevented unless the other prevented him, and vice versa (5); hence, neither of them would be prevented [except through the other’s prevention.] (6)
Moreover, this one would prevent the other, and the other would prevent this one. Each would therefore be both preventing and prevented, which combines two contradictories.
These and other arguments (7) demonstrate (8) the impossibility of two Lords who either assist one another or prevent one another. Nothing remains, then, except that each of them be independently capable,