could be capable only through the other’s enabling him, this would be equivalent to saying:
“He could possess power only through the other’s empowering him.”
Furthermore, on this supposition, each would be prevented from acting independently by the other. Each would thus be both a preventer and one prevented. Yet such a being (1) could be a preventer only if he had the power to prevent; and whoever has the power to prevent another from acting has an even stronger claim to possess the power to act himself. Thus, each could be an agent (2) only if he had the power to act; but if (3) he had the power to act, he could not be prevented from doing so. It is therefore impossible for each of them to be both a preventer and one prevented, (4) even though this necessarily follows from their being required to agree in acting. It is thus known that it is impossible for them to be required to agree in acting, and it is established that they can differ.] (5)
Whenever it is assumed that they must agree (6), this is intrinsically impossible. This (7) is possible only among created beings, because their power is derived from a source other than themselves.
Thus, if it were said:
“This one cannot possess power until the other possesses power,”
there could be a third party (8) who empowers them both. Hence, one created being can assist another, whereas mutual assistance between two creators (9) is impossible, because each of two created beings who assist one another possesses power