For those earlier scholars understood that the necessary concurrence of the two wills would entail the incapacity of each, [just as their mutually thwarting one another would entail the incapacity of each] (1). Some of them therefore refrained from mentioning this formulation (2), because their purpose was to show that (3) positing two lords entails the incapacity of each. If it were said, “Neither can act contrary to the other,” this would demonstrate his incapacity even more clearly.
Others explained this, just as they also established (4) the impossibility of either one acting independently. This may be stated as follows: if two lords are posited, then either each possesses power independently, or neither possesses power except through the other. [If neither possesses power except through the other] (5), this would be intrinsically impossible and would entail circularity among causes and agents. For it would entail that (* each had made the other capable, although neither could act until the other (6) was capable. If each had made the other capable, he would thereby have made him an agent, and it would not be the case that *) (7) each had made the other a Lord (8), since a Lord must necessarily possess power (9). Thus, the one would have made the other capable, an agent, and a Lord, and vice versa.