one of them wills the sun to rise (1) in the east, while the other wills it to rise in the west [or from another direction] (2). It would then be impossible for both of their wills to be fulfilled, since that would entail combining two mutually exclusive opposites. It follows either (3) that neither of their wills is fulfilled, in which case neither would be a Lord (4), (5 or that one’s will is fulfilled rather than the other’s 5) (5), in which case the one whose will was fulfilled would be the Lord, to the exclusion of the other.

The argument may also be formulated as follows (6): if each wills one of two states, one or the other of which the subject must necessarily possess—for example, if one wills that a body move and the other wills that it remain at rest—it would be impossible for both their wills to be fulfilled, (7 and impossible for both their wills to go unfulfilled 7) (7), since a body cannot be devoid of either motion or rest. It follows necessarily that the will of one must be fulfilled rather than the other’s, and he would therefore be the Lord.

A well-known objection is raised against this argument: the two wills might concur, in which case no disagreement would result. Many later theologians responded to this in various ways, but others challenged their responses (8), as has (9) been discussed at length in its proper place. These theologians did not discover the formulation given by their predecessors, such as al-Asharī, al-Qādī Abū Bakr, Abū al-Husayn al-Basrī, al-Qādī Abū Yalā, and others.