condition. Thus, in external reality there is neither an absolute without condition nor an absolute subject to the condition of absoluteness. Rather, only that which is determinate and particularized exists there. Thus, what (1) the mind conceives as absolute, without the condition of qualification, exists in external reality subject to the condition of qualification.

These people confused what exists in minds with what exists as concrete entities. We have discussed this at length elsewhere and explained which errors of the logicians cause misguidance in metaphysical and natural matters—for example, taking intelligible entities that exist only in the intellect to be entities existing in external reality. There are other such errors, but this is not the place to discuss them at length.

[These logicians—the metaphysicians among them and others—also say: “Universals exist only in minds, not among concrete entities.” Thus, in some places in their writings one finds statements that expose the error of statements they make elsewhere. For Allah endowed His servants with sound and wholesome innate dispositions, while corruption of the innate disposition is incidental. It is therefore rare to find anyone who has (2) corrupt discourse without also finding in his discourse something that exposes the corruption of his earlier statement and reveals his self-contradiction.] (3).

The purpose here is to draw attention to the doctrine of divine unity advanced by these (4) philosophers. These philosophers fell into the same error concerning the term “the Necessary” as the Mu'tazilah did concerning the term “the Pre-Eternal.” They said:

“The Necessary can only be one, so He can have no affirmative attribute,”

just as the others said:

“The Pre-Eternal can only be one, so He can have no affirmative attribute” (5).

Through this and other matters, error became evident in the discourse of the later speculative theologians who mixed speculative theology