Minhaj as-Sunnah - Ibn Taimiya - (3/302)

Minhaj as-SunnahIbn Taimiya

universals: genus, species, differentia, property, and common accident—where they imagined that a universal (1) shared by multiple things exists in external reality.

We have already called attention to this and explained that a shared universal exists in external reality only in an individuated form in which there is no sharing. Commonality, generality, and universality apply to it only when it exists in the mind, not in external reality.

They divided the universal into three categories: natural, logical, and intellectual.

The natural universal is that which is absolute without condition, such as the human being considered as such, apart from all its qualifications.

The logical universal consists in its being general or specific, and universal or particular. Its very description in these terms is logical, because logic (2) examines propositions in respect of their being universal or particular.

The intellectual universal is the combination of the two: the human being described as general and absolute. This does not exist (* except in the mind according to them, excepting what is related of Plato’s followers concerning their affirmation of the Platonic Forms. There is no doubt that this is false, for external reality does not contain *) (3) anything general.

As for the logical universal, it too exists in the mind.

As for the natural universal, they may say that it exists in external reality. Thus, when we say, “this human being,” it contains the human being considered as such. But the response is: it exists in external reality, but (4) subject to individuation and specification, not to the qualification of absoluteness, nor absolutely without

(1) Manuscripts (N) and (M): “each”—an erroneous reading. (2) Manuscripts (A), (B), (N), and (M): “because the logician.” (3) The text between the asterisks is absent only from manuscript (M). (4) The word “but” is absent only from manuscript (B).

الْكُلِّيَّاتِ: الْجِنْسِ، وَالنَّوْعِ، وَالْفَصْلِ، وَالْخَاصَّةِ، وَالْعَرَضِ الْعَامِّ - حَيْثُ تَوَهَّمُوا أَنَّهُ يَكُونُ فِي الْخَارِجِ كُلِّيٌّ (١) مُشْتَرَكٌ فِيهِ. وَقَدْ قَدَّمْنَا التَّنْبِيهَ عَلَى هَذَا وَبَيَّنَّا أَنَّ الْكُلِّيَّ الْمُشْتَرَكَ فِيهِ لَا يُوجَدُ فِي الْخَارِجِ إِلَّا مُخْتَصًّا لَا اشْتِرَاكَ فِيهِ، وَالِاشْتِرَاكُ وَالْعُمُومُ وَالْكُلِّيَّةُ إِنَّمَا تَعْرِضُ لَهُ إِذَا كَانَ ذِهْنِيًّا لَا خَارِجِيًّا. وَهُمْ قَسَّمُوا الْكُلِّيَّ ثَلَاثَةَ أَقْسَامٍ: طَبِيعِيٌّ، وَمَنْطِقِيٌّ، وَعَقْلِيٌّ. فَالطَّبِيعِيُّ: هُوَ الْمُطْلَقُ لَا بِشَرْطٍ، كَالْإِنْسَانِ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ هُوَ، مَعَ قَطْعِ النَّظَرِ عَنْ جَمِيعِ قُيُودِهِ. وَالْمَنْطِقِيُّ: كَوْنُهُ عَامًّا وَخَاصًّا، وَكُلِّيًّا وَجُزْئِيًّا، فَنَفْسُ وَصْفِهِ بِذَلِكَ مَنْطِقِيٌّ ; لِأَنَّ الْمَنْطِقَ (٢) يَبْحَثُ فِي الْقَضَايَا مِنْ جِهَةِ كَوْنِهَا كُلِّيَّةً وَجُزْئِيَّةً. وَالْعَقْلِيُّ: هُوَ مَجْمُوعُ الْأَمْرَيْنِ، وَهُوَ الْإِنْسَانُ الْمَوْصُوفُ بِكَوْنِهِ عَامًّا وَمُطْلَقًا، وَهَذَا لَا يُوجَدُ (* إِلَّا فِي الذِّهْنِ عِنْدَهُمْ، إِلَّا مَا يُحْكَى عَنْ شِيعَةِ أَفْلَاطُونَ مِنْ إِثْبَاتِ الْمُثُلِ الْأَفْلَاطُونِيَّةِ، وَلَا رَيْبَ فِي بُطْلَانِ هَذَا، فَإِنَّ الْخَارِجَ لَا يُوجَدُ *) (٣) فِيهِ عَامٌّ. وَأَمَّا الْمَنْطِقِيُّ: فَهُوَ كَذَلِكَ فِي الذِّهْنِ. وَأَمَّا الطَّبِيعِيُّ: فَقَدْ يَقُولُونَ إِنَّهُ ثَابِتٌ فِي الْخَارِجِ، فَإِذَا قُلْنَا: هَذَا الْإِنْسَانُ، فَفِيهِ الْإِنْسَانُ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ هُوَ لَكِنْ يُقَالُ: هُوَ ثَابِتٌ فِي الْخَارِجِ لَكِنْ (٤) بِقَيْدِ التَّعْيِينِ وَالتَّخْصِيصِ لَا بِقَيْدِ الْإِطْلَاقِ، وَلَا مُطْلَقًا لَا

(١) ن، م: كُلٌّ، وَهُوَ خَطَأٌ. (٢) أ، ب، ن، م: لِأَنَّ الْمَنْطِقِيَّ. (٣) مَا بَيْنَ النَّجْمَتَيْنِ سَاقِطٌ مِنْ (م) فَقَطْ. (٤) لَكِنْ: سَاقِطَةٌ مِنْ (ب) فَقَطْ.