with one another (1), in external reality, any of their particular characteristics—not their necessity, existence, quiddity, or anything else. Rather, one merely resembles the other in that respect.
That which is absolute and common to both is only a universal (2) shared by both in the mind. In external reality, it is not something universal and general that they share.
Rather, to say that if two necessary existents share (3) in necessity (4), each of them must be distinguished (5) from the other by what is particular to it, is (6) like saying that if they share in reality, each must be distinguished from the other (7) by what is particular to it. Reality is found in both a general and a particular form, just as necessity (8) is found in both a general and a particular form. The general is general and shared only in the mind; in external reality it exists only as something particular in which there is no sharing. That in respect of which there is commonality admits of no differentiation, while that in respect of which there is differentiation admits of no commonality. Thus, no single thing remains in external reality in which there is both commonality and differentiation (9). Rather, each has an attribute in which it resembles the other (10), and an attribute in which it does not resemble it.
Their error in these metaphysical matters is of the same kind as their error (11) in logic concerning