Minhaj as-Sunnah - Ibn Taimiya - (3/300)

Minhaj as-SunnahIbn Taimiya

philosophers. Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī also presented both arguments in substance in The Incoherence of the Philosophers (1).

Al-Rāzī (2) and al-Āmidī (3) answered them by denying that necessity is a positive attribute, along with other responses of this kind that we endorse.

The answer, however, is twofold.

First: the counterargument. Existence is divided into necessary and possible existence, and each of these two modes of existence is distinguished from the other by its own particularity (4). It would then follow that (5) the Necessary Existent is composed of that by which it shares in common and that by which it is distinguished. It would also follow that necessary existence is an effect.

The same counterargument may be made in terms of reality: reality is divided into necessary and possible, and the necessary is distinguished from the possible by what is particular to it. It would therefore follow that necessary reality is composed of what is shared and what is particular, and that necessary reality is an effect. The counterargument may likewise be framed in terms of quiddity, for it is divided into necessary and possible, and so forth.

Second: resolving the specious argument. Two things existing (6) in external reality—whether both are necessary or possible, and whether the division is posited between two existents, two substances, two bodies, two animals, two human beings, or anything else—do not share

(1) See al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*, pp. 158–160, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā, 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1958). (2) See al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāhith al-Mashriqiyya*, vol. 2, pp. 451, 456 (Hyderabad, 1343 AH). (3) See al-Āmidī, *Ghāyat al-Marām fī ʿIlm al-Kalām*, ed. Hasan Mahmūd ʿAbd al-Latīf, pp. [0–9] 53–155 (Cairo, 1391 AH/1971). (4) Manuscript (M): “with a particular property.” (5) Manuscripts (N) and (M): “that the being of…” (6) Manuscripts (A) and (B): “the two existences.”

الْفَلَاسِفَةِ، وَقَدْ ذَكَرَهُمَا بِمَعْنَاهُمَا أَبُو حَامِدٍ الْغَزَّالِيُّ فِي " تَهَافُتِ الْفَلَاسِفَةِ " (١) . وَقَدْ أَجَابَ عَنْهُمَا الرَّازِيُّ (٢) وَالْآمِدِيُّ (٣) بِمَنْعِ كَوْنِ الْوُجُوبِ صِفَةً ثُبُوتِيَّةً، وَنَحْوِ ذَلِكَ مِنَ الْأَجْوِبَةِ الَّتِي نَرْضَاهَا. لَكِنَّ الْجَوَابَ مِنْ وَجْهَيْنِ. أَحَدُهُمَا: الْمُعَارَضَةُ وَذَلِكَ أَنَّ الْوُجُودَ يَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى وَاجِبٍ وَمُمْكِنٍ، وَكُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مِنَ الْوُجُودَيْنِ يَمْتَازُ عَنِ الْآخَرِ بِخَاصَّتِهِ، (٤) فَيَلْزَمُ أَنْ يَكُونَ (٥) الْوَاجِبُ مُرَكَّبًا مِمَّا بِهِ الِاشْتِرَاكُ، وَمِمَّا بِهِ الِامْتِيَازُ، وَأَيْضًا فَيَلْزَمُ أَنْ يَكُونَ الْوُجُودُ الْوَاجِبُ مَعْلُولًا، وَالْمُعَارَضَةُ أَيْضًا بِالْحَقِيقَةِ، فَإِنَّ الْحَقِيقَةَ تَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى وَاجِبٍ وَمُمْكِنٍ، وَالْوَاجِبُ يَمْتَازُ عَنِ الْمُمْكِنِ بِمَا يَخُصُّهُ، فَيَلْزَمُ أَنْ تَكُونَ الْحَقِيقَةُ الْوَاجِبَةُ مُرَكَّبَةً مِنَ الْمُشْتَرَكِ وَالْمُخْتَصِّ، وَيَلْزَمُ أَنْ تَكُونَ الْحَقِيقَةُ الْوَاجِبَةُ مَعْلُولَةً، وَالْمُعَارَضَةُ بِلَفْظِ الْمَاهِيَةِ، فَإِنَّهَا تَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى وَاجِبٍ وَمُمْكِنٍ إِلَى آخِرِهِ. وَالثَّانِي حَلُّ الشُّبْهَةِ وَذَلِكَ أَنَّ الشَّيْئَيْنِ الْمَوْجُودَيْنِ (٦) فِي الْخَارِجِ سَوَاءٌ كَانَا وَاجِبَيْنِ أَوْ مُمْكِنَيْنِ، وَسَوَاءٌ قُدِّرَ التَّقْسِيمُ فِي مَوْجُودَيْنِ، أَوْ جَوْهَرَيْنِ أَوْ جِسْمَيْنِ أَوْ حَيَوَانَيْنِ أَوْ إِنْسَانَيْنِ أَوْ غَيْرِ ذَلِكَ - لَمْ يُشْرِكْ

(١) انْظُرْ: " تَهَافُتِ الْفَلَاسِفَةِ " لِلْغَزَّالِيِّ، ص ١٥٨ - ١٦٠ تَحْقِيقُ الدُّكْتُورِ سُلَيْمَانْ دُنْيَا، الطَّبْعَةَ الثَّالِثَةَ، دَارَ الْمَعَارِفِ، الْقَاهِرَةَ ١٩٥٨. (٢) انْظُرِ: " الْمَبَاحِثِ الْمَشْرِقِيَّةِ لِلرَّازِيِّ " ٢ - ٤٥١، ٤٥٦، ط حَيْدَرَ آبَادَ، ١٣٤٣ هـ. (٣) انْظُرْ: " غَايَةِ الْمَرَامِ فِي عِلْمِ الْكَلَامِ " لِلْآمِدِيِّ، تَحْقِيقُ الدُّكْتُورِ حَسَنْ مَحْمُودْ عَبْدِ اللَّطِيفِ ص [٠ - ٩] ٥٣ - ١٥٥ ط. الْقَاهِرَةَ ١٣٩١، ١٩٧١. (٤) م: بِخَاصِّيَّةٍ. (٥) ن، م: أَنَّ كَوْنَ. (٦) أ، ب: الْوُجُودِيَّيْنِ.