of that which necessarily produces by virtue of its essence in eternity *) (1), whose effect necessarily accompanies it (2). If motion is not an inseparable concomitant [of it] (3), then it is temporally originated and therefore requires a cause—necessarily (4) a temporally originated one. But that which comes about through something temporally originated cannot arise from a complete eternal cause, since the effect of that which necessarily produces by virtue of its essence cannot lag behind it.

Hence, the doctrine of those who hold that temporal events proceed from a complete eternal cause within which, and from which, nothing ever arises is even more corrupt than the doctrine of those who say that they came about through an agent possessed of power without a temporally originated cause. The latter affirm an agent but do not affirm a temporally originated cause, whereas the former (5) are committed to denying that temporal events have any agent, since a complete cause that necessarily produces by virtue of its essence in eternity cannot originate anything whatsoever. Accordingly, in their view, temporal events arise only through the motion of the celestial sphere, yet they posit nothing above the sphere that originated its motion. Indeed, their doctrine concerning the motions of the celestial spheres and all other temporal events is of the same kind as the doctrine of the Qadariyyah concerning the acts of living beings. Its true implication is that these things arise without anyone originating them. The Qadariyyah, however, restrict this claim to the acts of living beings, whereas these people apply it to every temporal event in the higher and lower realms.

The Second Argument:

The agent—whether He possesses power, necessarily produces by virtue of His essence, or whether it is said, “He possesses power and necessarily produces by His will and power”—must exist when the thing produced exists. He cannot be nonexistent when the thing produced exists, since what is nonexistent cannot produce an existent thing, and the very